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Abstract. Security is likely becoming a critical factor in the future adoption of
provenance technology, because of the risk of inadvertent disclosure of sensitive
information. In this survey paper we review the state of the art in secure prove-
nance, considering mechanisms for controlling access, and the extent to which
these mechanisms preserve provenance integrity. We examine seven systems or
approaches, comparing features and identifying areas for future work.
1 Introduction
Automatically associating data with metadata describing its provenance has emerged
as an important requirement in databases, scientiVc computing, and other domains
that place a premium on reproducibility, accountability or trust [27]. Providing such
metadata typically involves instrumenting a system with monitoring or logging that
tracks how results depend on inputs and on other, perhaps untrustworthy, sources.
Publishing the entire provenance record associated with a computation is not al-
ways feasible or desirable. Disclosing certain information may violate security, privacy,
or need-to-know policies, or expose sensitive intellectual property. Sometimes the
complete provenance record may be too detailed for the intended audience, or may
leak irrelevant implementation detail. But simply omitting some of the provenance
information may leave it unable to certify the origins of the data product.
We refer to the general problem of ensuring that provenance solutions satisfy
not only disclosure requirements but also security or privacy requirements as the
problem of provenance sanitization or provenance abstraction. A number of approaches
to provenance sanitization have been proposed recently [3,8,15,16,18], sometimes
under other names such as provenance views or provenance redaction. These techniques
have been developed mainly for scientiVc workWow systems, where provenance is
viewed as a directed acyclic graph, as in the Open Provenance Model [28].
Existing approaches have several elements in common. Typically, an obfuscation
policy speciVes the aspects of the provenance which are to be hidden. A disclosure
policy may additionally specify that certain other aspects of the provenance are to
remain visible. Sanitization then involves transforming the provenance graph to obtain
a view which satisVes both the obfuscation and the disclosure policies.
Few of the existing systems have been formally studied, and the security guarantees
they actually provide are unclear. Some do provide formal guarantees, but are narrow
in applicability or have other shortcomings. Moreover, many systems provide some
form of security or conVdentiality without considering the impact on the causal
or explanatory role of provenance. In this paper we review the state of the art in
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provenance sanitization by reviewing seven systems or approaches: ZOOM [2,13],
security views [8], surrogates [3], ProPub [18], provenance views [15,16], provenance
abstraction [26], and provenance redaction [7].
2 Related work
The relationship between security and provenance has been considered in several
survey or vision papers [20,4,23,25]. This paper focuses narrowly on provenance
sanitization via graph transformations; here we brieWy mention some related topics.
Formal foundations. Chong [11] gave an early deVnition of provenance-related security
policies. Cheney [9] subsequently generalized this approach to notions of disclosure
and obfuscation with respect to a query Q on the underlying provenance, and a view
P of the provenance. Obfuscation is similar to (non-quantitative) opacity in computer
security [1], and means that P does not allow the user to determine whether the
underlying provenance satisVes Q. Disclosure means that P preserves Q-equivalence.
Secure provenance for evolving data. Provenance tracking is an especially critical issue
for data that changes over time [6], for which provenance can be hard to recover
after the fact. Work in this area to date includes tamper-resistant provenance for
databases [30], use of cryptographic techniques to ensure integrity of document version
history [21], and database audit log sanitization [22].
3 Background concepts and terminology
The solutions surveyed in §4 mainly target scientiVc workWow systems, with similar
notions of provenance; we review some common concepts here. Some acquaintance
with basic graph theory will be useful. For more background on scientiVc workWow
provenance, we refer the reader to Davidson and Freire [14].
WorkWow systems and provenance graphs. A workWow system, or simply workWow, is a
directed graph capturing the high-level structure of a software-based business process
or scientiVc process. Nodes represent software components called modules, or tasks.
Edges represent links, or data channels, connecting modules. Sometimes modules are
considered to have input and output ports to which data channels are connected. Fig. 1a
shows a simple workWow with modulesm1 tom6.
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Fig. 1: Cyclic workWow, plus bipartite provenance graph for a possible run
Node labels are typically used to identify modules. Iterative processes can be
modelled by cycles, if permitted, or via a built-in construct for iteration. WorkWow
systems often support other coordination patterns such as conditional branching and
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synchronisation which are beyond scope of the systems considered here. Some permit
composite modules, i.e. modules that contain other modules.
A provenance graph is a directed, acyclic graph (DAG) recording the causal history
of a data product. Often such a graph represents the (coarse-grained) execution of a
software system, such as a workWow; more generally, provenance graphs can describe
ad hoc processes or collaborations involving both human and software components.
The nodes of the graph represent participants, actions and intermediate artifacts.
Fig. 1b shows a provenance graph that captures one possible execution of the
workWow in Fig. 1a. The rectangular nodes, or activities, represent invocations of
modules; the circular nodes d1 to d9, sometimes called entities, record data values
passed between modules. Moreover activities yield entities, and entities feed into
activities; a graph that is partitioned in this way is called bipartite. Bipartiteness is just
one of many possible design choices for graph-structured provenance; for example,
one could add d1, . . . , d9 as labels to the edges instead of using special nodes.
When a provenance graph represents a run of an iterative process, each module in-
vocation must give rise to a distinct node, to maintain acyclicity. If necessary additional
tags on the node label can be used to distinguish invocations of the same module.
Sanitizing provenance graphs The goal of provenance sanitization is to derive a sanitized
view which hides or abstracts sensitive details of a provenance graph, whilst preserving
some of its disclosure properties. Typically one wants the view itself to be a well-
formed provenance graph. Fig. 2 below illustrates a simple provenance graph with two
examples of views. On the right, tasks c1 and c2 have been abstracted into a single task
c3; on the left, entities d2 and d4 and intermediate task c2 have been abstracted into a
single entity d5.
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Fig. 2: Two possible views of a provenance graph
Both views are examples of quotients, arguably the simplest notion of graph view. One
speciVes a quotient of a graph G = (V,E) by giving a partitioning V ′ = {V1, . . . , Vn}
of its nodes. The partitioning induces another graph G′ = (V ′, E′) where there is an
edge (Vi, Vj) ∈ E′ iU there is an edge in G between a node of Vi and a node of Vj ,
for any i 6= j. In Fig. 2 the dotted border labeled c3 determines a partitioning if we
consider each of the remaining nodes to inhabit a singleton partition; the dotted border
labeled d5 determines a diUerent partitioning, under a similar assumption.
Quotients are a natural forms of provenance view as they preserve paths, which
represent relationships of direct or indirect dependency between nodes. If paths are
preserved then related nodes are mapped to related nodes in the view; in other words,
every dependency in the original graph gives rise to a dependency between the
corresponding view nodes. Quotients preserve paths but not edges; for example the
edges (d4, c2) and (c2, d2) have no counterpart in view #2 because all three nodes are
mapped to d5. Indeed edge-preservation, or homomorphism, is a stronger property than
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we usually require for provenance sanitization, where dependency is assumed to be
reWexive and transitive.
It can also be important to consider whether paths are reWected: whether nodes
are related in the view only if there exist related nodes in the original graph which
map to those nodes in the view. This too can be understood in terms of dependency,
since it means that every reported dependency arises from a dependency between
corresponding nodes in the original graph. Quotients do not in general reWect paths,
because they coarsen the dependency relation: in view #1, for example, d1 now appears
to depend on d4, and d2 on d3. This can be problematic if it violates cardinality
constraints, such as a requirement that every artifact be generated by at most one
activity [29].
4 Survey of techniques for provenance sanitization
In the ZOOM system of Biton, Cohen-Boulakia and Davidson [2,13], the user
obtains a provenance view by Vrst deVning an abstract workWow view. A ZOOM
workWow is a directed graph of atomic modules; a provenance graph is a DAG of
invocations with edges labeled with runtime values. A workWow view is a quotienting
which partitions the system into composite modules; for a given run of the workWow,
the corresponding “quotient run” can then be obtained automatically by deriving
invocations of each composite module from the invocations of its constituent modules.
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Fig. 3: ZOOM: deriving a provenance view from a workWow view
Fig. 3 illustrates the ZOOM approach. In Fig. 3a we see the original workWow with
the partitioning identiVed by dashed borders labeled c2 and c3. The modulesm1,m2
andm5 are assumed to be in singleton partitions. The induced workWow view is shown
in Fig. 3b. Then, Fig. 3c shows an execution of the workWow with data labels omitted;
here the dashed borders represent a partitioning of the invocations corresponding to
invocations of the composite modules c2 and c3. Fig. 3d shows the the corresponding
quotient run where each node is mapped to its equivalence class.
ZOOM is not overtly motivated by security, but its views can be seen as abstracting
away uninteresting parts of the graph while ensuring user-identiVed “relevant” parts
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remain visible. ZOOM is unique in respecting the semantic relationship between
program and provenance, as alluded to by the dotted run arrow relating Figs. 3b and
3d. Moreover being able to derive provenance views from ex post facto modularisations
of a workWow is extremely powerful. However, it seems unlikely that their method for
doing so (sketched only brieWy in the papers) will generalise to workWows with non-
trivial control Wow or settings where submodules are shared by composite modules.
In [13], most of the focus is on workWow views instead, in particular a method for
deriving workWow views that preserve and reWect certain structural properties of the
workWow, given a user-speciVed set of modules that are of interest.
The security views of Chebotko, Chang, Lu, Fotouhi and Yang [8] provide
both access control and abstraction for scientiVc workWow provenance. Their work-
Wows are DAGs with additional structure to model hierarchical tasks; the data channels
of a composite task are those of its constituent tasks that cross the boundary of the
composite task, relating composite tasks to the partitions of a quotient view. However,
composite tasks are Vxed features of the workWow rather than on-the-Wy abstractions
as in ZOOM, above. Being acyclic, workWows are unable to represent iteration.
To obtain a security view, one Vrst speciVes the accessibility of the various tasks
and data channels, marking each element as accessible or inaccessible. Inheritance
rules deVne the accessibility of an element if it is not given explicitly. Access control
can be speciVed down to the level of individual ports; consistency constraints ensure
that (for example) a data value inaccessible on one port is not accessible via another
port. The access speciVcation is then used to derive a provenance view from which
inaccessible data values, tasks and channels have been removed.
t1 t3 t5 t6
t4
t2
abstractt1 t3 t5 t6
delete edge
t1 t3 t4
t2
(a)
(b) (c)
t4
t2
Fig. 4: Security views: combining abstraction with access control
Fig. 4a shows a run of a hierarchical workWow with two levels of composite task;
both data nodes and ports have been elided for brevity. A node written as • indicates
an input or output. In Fig. 4b, the data channel between t3 and t5 has been deleted to
conform to the access speciVcation. Although dummy nodes, similar to the surrogates
of Blaustein et al. below [3], may be added to the view to preserve well-formedness
constraints, more general integrity requirements are not considered. For example once
the edge between t3 and t5 has been deleted, the view no longer preserves dependencies,
and so its ability to provide a full account of the output is compromised. Access control
can however be combined with quotienting. In Fig. 4c the composite module t4 has
been abstracted to a single node with two inputs, preserving the dependency structure
of Fig. 4b, even though the latter view is unsound.
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Blaustein, Chapman, Seligman, Allen and Rosenthal [3] present an approach
based on surrogates. They deVne a protected account of a graph G to be any graph G′,
along with a path-preserving function from the nodes of G′ to the nodes of G. Since
by deVnition every path in the view has an image in the original graph, a protected
account necessarily reWects dependencies, but in general does not preserve them.
Surrogates are a mechanism for publishing dependency information in a way that still
protects sensitive nodes and edges.
Fig. 5a, adapted from [3], shows a typical graph with sensitive nodes and edges in
red. Fig. 5b shows a protected account where e has been deleted and f replaced by
a surrogate f ′, shown with a dotted border, that hides its sensitive data (perhaps its
identity). The view in Fig. 5c hides two more edges, breaking the indirect dependency
between c and g. This is repaired in Fig. 5d by a surrogate edge (dotted arrow).
b
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f ′ g
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c
f ′ g
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Fig. 5: Surrogates: provenance graph, plus three protected accounts
Blaustein et al.’s approach has three components: user privileges, which allow
the graph provider to control graph access down to the level of individual ports; an
algorithm for protecting graphs by deleting nodes and edges and adding surrogates;
and metrics for analyzing disclosure and obfuscation properties of the resulting graph.
For a given set of user privileges, their algorithm purportedly obtains a protected
account which is “maximally informative”, according to a utility metric derived from
the proportion of G-paths retained in G′ plus the similarity of each node in G′ to its
counterpart in G. However deVnitions given are rather informal, and the theorems
lack proofs, making this claim hard to evaluate.
Even when a protected account satisVes a particular obfuscation policy, an attacker
may still be able to infer the original graph G from G′. To study this, Blaustein et al.
introduce the notion of opacity, a measure of the diXculty of inferring an edge in G
that is not present in G′, given a user-supplied model of the attacker. (The notion of
opacity in the security literature [1] is somewhat diUerent.)
The ProPub framework of Dey, Zinn and Ludäscher [18], based on Datalog,
provides what the authors refer to as “policy-aware” provenance sanitization. A prove-
nance query is expressed as a set of Datalog facts, asserting that the provenance for
certain data items is to be disclosed, plus additional requirements relating to sanitiza-
tion and disclosure. ProPub works directly with a provenance graph, which may not
have been derived from an underlying workWow. A sanitization requirement might
assert that certain data associated with a particular node is to be erased, that several
nodes are to be abstracted into a single node, or that some nodes are to be deleted; a
disclosure constraint might insist that a speciVc node is always retained in the view. In
addition there will usually be global policies which hold across all queries (for example
to outlaw “false dependencies” of the kind illustrated earlier in Fig. 2), as well as the
usual well-formedness conditions such as acyclicity or bipartiteness.
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A unique feature of ProPub is its ability to detect conWicts in the sanitization
and disclosure requirements and to assist with their resolution. When conWicts arise,
ProPub uses a ranking scheme and various auto-correction strategies to resolve them,
with the user also able to intervene to withdraw or modify a constraint in the light
of the conWicts. For example in Fig. 6, adapted from [18], a naïve abstraction of three
nodes into a single node c4 violates both acyclicity and bipartiteness:
d2
d3
d4
c1
c3
c2 d5
d6
d2
d3
c3
d5
d6
abstract
c4
c4
Fig. 6: ProPub:
conWict
detection
In this case a possible resolution would be to include d3 into the abstraction as well,
removing the cycle and restoring bipartiteness. Should applying a correction induce
other conWicts, the process of conWict resolution continues. Only when a conWict-free
variant of the query is obtained can a Vnal sanitized view be derived. Any constraints
rescinded during conWict resolution are reported alongside the sanitized view, providing
a certain level of “meta-provenance”, also a unique feature amongst the systems
considered here. For example, it might record that a spurious dependency was tolerated
in order to accommodate an abstraction. ProPub’s logical foundation also means that
the Vnal view is guaranteed to have the chosen disclosure and security properties.
Davidson et al. [15,16] tackle a rather diUerent problem with provenance views.
WorkWows are modelled as directed acyclic multigraphs (graphs with potentially more
than one edge between any two nodes). Edges are labeled with identiVers called
attributes which identify the port that the edge starts from; because workWows are
acyclic, the semantics of a workWow can be given as a relation R over the set of all
attributes, where each tuple consists of the data values that arise during a possible
execution. (Equivalently, one can consider each tuple to be a labeling function assigning
data values to ports.) In Fig. 7 below, adapted from [15], the workWow consists of three
modules computing Boolean functions. Port a4 of m1 is consumed by both m2 and
m3. The relation R for this particular workWow in shown in the middle of Figure7.
EUectively R is the natural join R1 ./ R2 ./ R3 of the relations R1, R2 and R3
capturing the extension (input-output mapping) of the modules individually.
m2 m3
m1
a4 a4
a3 a5
a1 a2
a6 a7
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1
a1 a3 a5 a6 a7
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1
all
abstract
possible
runs
R ΠV (R)
Fig. 7: Provenance views: hiding functional behaviour
Rather than hiding or abstracting parts of a particular run, Davidson et al. are
interested in hiding the extension of a sensitive modulemi, namely the relation Ri,
regardless of how many diUerent executions the user observes. They classify modules
as either public, whose behaviour is known a priori, or private, whose behaviour must
be inferred by observing R. Their approach, which is quantitative, is based on an
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extension of `-diversity [24] which they call Γ -privacy. A view is speciVed by giving
a set V of visible attributes. The relation ΠV (R), the projection of R to V (Fig. 7,
right), deVnes the information that is publicly visible through V . For any positive
natural number Γ , a private module is Γ -private with respect to V if for each input,
the number of possible outputs from that module consistent with ΠV (R) is greater
than Γ . With only this information, an attacker is unable to predict the output of the
module for a given input with probability greater than 1/Γ .
The Vrst paper [15] studies some speciVc cases, including standalone private
modules, multiple private modules, and heterogeneous workWows with a mixture of
private and public modules where public modules can be “privatized” by renaming,
so that their functional behaviour is no longer known. They show that standalone
Γ -privacy is composable in a workWow consisting only of private modules. The authors
also study the problem of Vnding minimum-cost views, given a cost function stating
the penalty of being denied access to hidden attributes. The second paper [16] studies
a more general solution for heterogeneous workWows, which involves propagating
hiding, i.e. hiding attributes of public modules if they might disclose information about
hidden attributes of private modules. They present a composability result generalizing
the one for the all-private setting, to single-predecessor (that is, tree-like) workWows.
The privacy problem studied by Davidson et al. is interesting, but their work so
far has a number of drawbacks. In particular, the PTIME bounds for the algorithms
for mixed workWows [16] assume a Vxed domain size, which in turn means that the
size of relation R is treated as a constant. If we take the domain size d and number of
attributes a into account, then the size of R is O(da), so treating it as a constant may
not be realistic. Moreover, it is also not always clear how to choose sensible values of
Γ . For example, with a domain of 1024×1024, 8-bit grayscale images, Γ may need to
be much higher than 106 to provide meaningful privacy, because changing a single
grayscale pixel does not hide much information. (This criticism also pertains to other
possibilistic deVnitions of security properties, such opacity [1] and obfuscation [9].)
Techniques from quantitative information Wow security [12], quantitative opacity [5]
or diUerential privacy [19] may be relevant here.
The provenance abstraction approach of Missier, Bryans, Gamble, Curcin
and Danger [26], implemented as ProvAbs, is based on graph quotienting and Vnding
partionings that satisfy both security needs and well-formedness constraints. Their
provenance graphs follow the PROV model [29] and its associated constraints spec-
iVcation [10]. First, Missier et al. consider simple bipartite provenance graphs with
node types representing activities and entities, and deVne three basic graph operations
pclose, extend and replace. Intuitively, pclose takes a subgraph which is a candidate
for replacement, and grows it until it is convex (there are no paths that lead out of the
subgraph and back in again); extend further grows the subgraph until both its “input”
nodes and its “output” nodes are homogeneous with respect to node type; and replace
contracts such subgraphs to single nodes and adjusts edges to preserve paths.
Fig. 8, adapted from [26], illustrates extend and replace. In Fig. 8a, the user selects
activity a2 and entity e3 for abstraction. Replacing these two nodes by either an activity
or an entity whilst preserving paths would violate bipartiteness. In Fig. 8b, extend
is used to grow the target subgraph to include e4, so that the output nodes of the
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Fig. 8: ProvAbs: growing a partition so that abstraction preserves bipartiteness
target subgraph are uniformly entities. Replacing the subgraph by a single abstract
entity e5 in Fig. 8c is now valid, although it coarsens the (transitive) dependencies by
introducing a path between a4 and a1.
Having shown how these transformations can be used to preserve basic validity
constraints, Missier et al. go on to consider graphs which incorporate the PROV agent
node type and associated relations such as attribution and delegation. They consider
three cases of increasing sophistication. Grouping a homogeneous set of agents into
a single abstract agent is relatively straightforward. Grouping agents and entities
together is trickier; the type of the target abstract node (entity or agent) must be
speciVed, and in order to maintain the type-correctness of certain relations between
actions and agents (waw, “was associated with”) and between entities and agents
(wat, “was attributed to”), the subgraph to be abstracted must made larger. Finally,
grouping arbitrary node types together presents the additional diXculty of agent-to-
agent delegation edges (abo, “acted on behalf of”), which require similar treatment.
Like ProPub, a key feature of ProvAbs is that transformations operate directly
on the provenance graph, and are thus more suited to situations where there is no
underlying workWow. Missier et al. claim that their system avoids introducing spurious
dependencies between nodes. However, their views are quotients, which in general
over-approximate dependencies, so technically this claim is only correct for provenance
applications where dependency is not required to be transitive.
The work of Cadenhead, Khadilkar, Kantarcioglu and Thuraisingham [7] on
provenance redaction is also based on graph rewriting. Their provenance graphs
are tripartite and conform to the Open Provenance Model’s labeled DAG format [28].
“Redacting”, or sanitizing, such a graph has two phases. First, the sensitive region GQ
(typically a single node or a path between two nodes) of the original graphG is isolated
using a graph query Q. Then, this region of the graph is transformed according to an
obfuscation policy expressed as rewrite rules. A rewrite rule has two components: a
production rule r : L → R, where L is matched against subgraphs of GQ, plus an
embedding speciVcation, which determines how edges are to be connected to R once it
has replaced L. The rewrites involve graph operations such as vertex contraction, edge
contraction, path contraction and node relabeling.
o
sp
r
dwdf
wgb
wcb
wcbwcb
p
r
dwdf
wgb
wcb
wcbabstract
Fig. 9: Provenance redaction:
abstraction by edge
contraction
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In Fig. 9 above, adapted from [7], hexagons represent agents, rectangles represent
processes, and circles represent artifacts. In the left graph, the gray triangle indicates
an area of the graph that was previously redacted. On the right, a further subgraph
is redacted by contracting the the wcb (“was controlled by”) edge relating a heart
operation o to the surgeon s who carried out the operation, and replacing the two
nodes by another gray triangle.
Cadenhead et al.’s work is implementation-focused. Several formal deVnitions are
given but not always made use of, and neither are their provenance or disclosure
properties analyzed. One issue they do not appear to address, in contrast for example
to Missier et al. (above), is preservation of basic well-formedness properties of the
provenance graph. While edge contraction (as a particular kind of quotient) preserves
dependencies, the interaction with tripartiness is potentially problematic. For example
in the view in Fig. 9, the new triangle has both an incoming and an outgoing wcb edge,
because it subsumes both an agent and a process. Moreover, as the authors themselves
point out, the obfuscation policy is only applied to a subgraphGQ of the original graph
G. Sensitive information available elsewhere in G will not be subject to the policy.
Information Wow techniques [17] may be relevant here.
5 Conclusions and future directions
We conclude our survey with a brief feature comparison, summarised in Table 1. The
column headings refer to broad feature areas (discussed in more detail below);  
indicates reasonably comprehensive support for that feature, # little or no support,
and G# somewhere in between. Necessarily this is a somewhat simplistic assessment.
System Int Dep Acc Qry Sem Form Conf Meta
ZOOM [2,13] G#  G# # G# # # #
Security views [8] G# G#  # # # G# #
Surrogates [3] # G#  # # # G# #
ProPub [18] G# G#   #   G#
Provenance views [15,16] # G# G# G# G#  # #
ProvAbs [26]    G# # # G# #
Provenance redaction [7] G#    # # # #
Table 1: Feature comparison for the approaches surveyed
Integrity. We divide integrity features into basic integrity maintenance (Int) and
integrity of causal or dependency structure (Dep). Even systems that make some eUort
to preserve the latter, such as provenance redaction, may in so doing violate low-level
integrity constraints. In the future it seems likely that users will take low-level integrity
for granted.
Preservation or reWection of dependency structure is more challenging because
of the inherent tensions with obfuscation requirements. When arbitrary nodes or
edges can be deleted, then the user may be responsible for repairing the damage, as
with security views or surrogates. ProPub oUers greater automation through conWict
detection; ProvAbs and provenance redaction make safer (if simplistic) assumptions,
by working mainly with quotient views.
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Sanitization. Sanitization features range from explicit Vne-grained access control
(Acc), which all systems provide in some form or another, to query-based abstraction
(Qry), as oUered by ProPub and provenance redaction. Query-based systems typically
subsume Vne-grained access control, via Vne-grained queries.
Formal and semantic properties. Few of the surveyed systems consider the problem of
relating provenance views to the semantics of the underlying system (Sem). Instead,
they operate directly on provenance graphs, without regard to how the graph was
created. This is Wexible, but means one cannot easily treat the provenance view as
an (abstracted) account of how something was computed. ZOOM stands out in this
respect, in relating provenance views to workWow views for simple kinds of workWow.
On the other hand, this is a hard problem to solve in a general way.
Few existing systems provide formal guarantees of obfuscation or disclosure prop-
erties (Form). ProPub has the advantage of a solid logical foundation. The Γ -privacy of
provenance views is a formal notion of (quantitative) opacity, but the goal is somewhat
diUerent from the other systems considered.
ConWict detection and resolution. As mentioned, ProPub stands out in being able
to automatically detect conWicts between obfuscation and disclosure requirements
(Conf), thanks to its logic-based approach. It is also the only system which makes
conWict resolution an explicit and persistent part of the process, providing a certain
level of “meta-provenance” for the sanitization process (Meta). If provenance security
techniques are widely adopted, it seems likely that how provenance is manipulated to
hide or reveal information will itself often be the point of interest (cf. “provenance of
provenance” [29]).
Undoubtedly, controlling access to sensitive provenance metadata is of growing impor-
tance, and moreover we sometimes simply want to deliver provenance information at a
particular level of detail. However, as the summary above highlights, current methods
for provenance sanitization are immature. Future eUort should focus on semantics,
formal guarantees, and techniques for detecting and resolving conWicting policies.
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